In the early stages of the process of industry evolution, firms are financially constrained and might pay different wages to workers according to their expectations about the prospects for advancement offered by each firm's job ladder. This paper argues that, nevertheless, if the output market is competitive, the positive predictions of the perfectly competitive model are still a good description of the long run outcome. If firms maximize the discounted sum of constrained profits, financing expenditure out of retained earnings, profits are driven down to zero as the perfectly competitive model predicts. Ex ante identical firms may follow different growth paths in which workers work for a lower entry-wage in firms expected to grow more. In the steady state, however, workers performing the same job, in ex-ante identical firms, receive the same wage. I explain when the long run outcome is efficient, when it is not, and why firms that produce inefficiently might drive the efficient ones out of the market even when the steady state has the positive properties of a Walrasian equilibrium. To some extent, it is not technological efficiency but workers' self-fulfilling expectations about their prospects for advancement within the firm that explains which firms have lower unit costs, grow more, and dominate the market.
INTRODUCTION
Economic theory predicts that in a market where many firms sell an homogeneous product, at least in the long run, each firm produces the quantity that maximizes profits and profits vanish. Although most economists agree with this description of the long run outcome of the process of industry evolution, much less consensus has been achieve on what forces lead an industry to that state. The theory of industry equilibrium in competitive markets relies on the existence of perfect markets for inputs and credit to explain why profits are dissipated. Indeed, if there is a complete set of perfectly competitive financial markets, each firm maximizes its market value, the markets for inputs are perfectly competitive, there are no turnover costs and there is either free entry or the technology displays constant returns to scale then profits are zero from the start and each firm produces at the profit maximizing level.
In sharp contrast with these assumptions, however, the empirical evidence suggests that new firms are financially constrained and the labor market, rather than being in a Walrasian equilibrium from the start, is better characterized by social institutions not considered in the theory of the firm under perfect competition.
Indeed, on the one hand, the problems of asymmetric information identified by authors like Stiglitz and Weiss [13] as the main explanation for the failure of the credit market are important in the early stages of the process of industry evolution. Consequently, financing through retained earnings is the norm rather than the exception. 1 The lack of access to credit prevents firms from achieving their optimal size from the start and explains why it takes time for profits to be dissipated. On the other hand, workers tend to be attached to the same firm for long periods, firms carry out most of the training of their employees and prefer to promote employees rather than recruiting new workers. Using the term made popular by Doeringer and Piore [8] , firms set up an internal labor market.
It is apparent that modern industries display many features that are not taken into account in the static model but are key to understanding why industry evolution takes time and how wages evolve. Therefore, the standard description of firm and industry behavior is at best the description of a steady state of some growth dynamics.
Economists like Alchian [1] and Friedman [10] recognized this a long time ago. Nelson and Winter [12, and references therein] were the first to provide a formal explanation of how such a steady state can be attained even if no firm follows a profit maximization rule. The key assumption in their work is that firms that make positive profits expand, those that make zero profits do not change capacity while those that make losses contract and search for new decision rules, a dynamic that can be motivated by the use of retained earnings to finance investment.
However, Blume and Easley [7] show that even though such retained earnings dynamic may explain why firms that do not maximize profits are driven out, it may not converge to a Walrasian equilibrium. In their model, capitalists finance production out of retained earnings, so that firms with uniformly smaller profits are driven out, and the interior steady states of the retained earnings dynamic are competitive equilibria and are Pareto optimal. They provide examples in which firms produce two goods operating different technologies and they show that if the 1 To quote Allen and Gale [3] : "Perhaps the most striking point [...] is that in all countries [US, UK, France and Germany] except Japan, retained earnings are the most important source of funds. External finance is simply not that important" (p. 76) 1 goods are sufficiently complementary, then the steady state of the retained earnings dynamic may be unstable. 2 The work of Nelson and Winter and Blume and Easley, however, focuses on the role of the retained earnings dynamic as a substitute for market completeness when the labor market is in a Walrasian equilibrium from the start.
In many industries, instead, the existence of training costs and firm specific abilities lead firms to set up internal labor markets where wages exceed those of competing industries. This is typically the case for skill intensive jobs at the top of the progression line. Since workers anticipate they may progress through the promotion line and obtain those high wages in the future, intuitively, the better the prospects for advancement displayed by the firm, ceteris paribus, the lower the worker's reservation entry-wage is. This insight introduces a potentially selffulfilling aspect in the process of industry evolution. Indeed, since firms rely on internal funds, firms believed to have better growth potential pay, ceteris paribus, lower wages, and have more revenue, end up promoting more workers and producing more, fulfilling workers' expectations. If ex-ante identical firms follow different growth paths, does the industry converge to a steady state? What are the efficiency properties of the steady state? Which firms pay lower wages? Is there an unambiguous positive relationship between technological efficiency and growth rates? These are some of the questions addressed in this work.
This paper argues that when firms finance expenditure out of retained earnings and the internal labor market arises as a cost minimizing institution (due to firm specific abilities and costly training), the industry converges to a steady state that is Walrasian-like in the sense that profits are dissipated, firms do not face financial constraints and markets clear. However, this steady state need not efficient. Indeed, along the transition, inefficient firms may display better growth prospects, pay lower entry-wages and grow more than the efficient ones. Adjustment costs do no play any role in my analysis because firms do not face a shortage in the internal supply of skilled workers along the process of industry evolution. Instead, I focus on the role of workers' expectations in shaping factor prices, an aspect that has not been addressed yet in the literature of industry evolution towards a Walrasian equilibrium.
I use a partial equilibrium model of industry evolution with long live firms that operate a two-task technology with constant returns and infinitely many overlapping generations of workers who live for two periods and consume out of wages. A worker who performs the first task when young develops high ability with positive probability.
Only high ability workers who undergo training can perform the second task when old. Training is costly for the firm but is costless for the worker who is free to move after the training process has ended. A worker who does not switch firms, is more productive in the second task than a worker trained by another firm. A key ingredient is that there are always firms that are yet to train when others have ended their training process and so the former can save the training cost by hiring workers trained by the latter. Firms compete for skilled workers a la Bertrand and so the 2 The intuition behind this result is as follows. Suppose firm 1's technology displays constant returns to scale and that with 1 unit of input at t it produces more of good 1 and less of good 2 at t + 1 than firm 2. When firm 1's financial capital exceeds its steady state level, total output of good 1 increases and total output of good 2 decreases. If the goods are sufficiently complementary, the extra output of good 1 and the corresponding reduction of good 2 reduces the market clearing price of good 1 so much that firm 1 suffers a large loss. In particular, firm 1's retained earnings can fall below its steady state level, while the opposite holds for firm 2 which mainly produces good 2. This causes the opposite response in the next period, with firm 2 producing more of good 2 than in the steady state. When the goods are sufficiently complementary, this cycle of profits and loses produces cycles in the levels of financial capital that do not damp out and allocative efficiency fails. They also have an example with four firms where the equilibrium does not converge to a steady state and technological efficiency fails. skilled worker's wage is his best outside offer. The higher the training cost is or the more general the skill is, the higher is the firms' willingness to pay for an externally trained worker and, therefore, the higher is his wage upon promotion. When the latter exceeds his wage at home, his reservation entry-wage depends on the worker's beliefs about the firm's promotion rate. Firms take output prices as given, cannot borrow and allocate their assets either to finance production or to a risk free activity. As long as profits are positive, firms find optimal to fully allocate their assets to finance production, driving prices down and pushing profits to the steady state level.
I show, by means of an example, that ex-ante identical firms can follow different growth paths towards the steady state. Ceteris paribus, firms expected to grow faster hire workers at a lower entry-wage and so technological efficiency fails along the transition. However, technological efficiency does hold in the steady state since growth rates are identical across firms. In the steady state, therefore, not only firms are not financially constrained and make zero profits but also workers who carry out identical jobs receive the same wage regardless of the firm that hires them and the labor markets clears as if it were in a Walrasian equilibrium. Allocative efficiency, instead, holds in the steady state if and only if the training cost is so low or the ability so firm specific that the skilled worker's wage equals his wage at home and so entry-wages are identical across productive activities. Otherwise, too little is produced compared to the efficient allocation of resources. The failure of technological and allocative efficiency is due both to the absence of a perfect credit market as well as the impossibility of paying old workers their opportunity cost out of the industry.
I also consider the case of firms with different technologies. Although economists long time ago recognized that firms with lower costs grow more, it is usually assumed that cost differentials stem from technological factors.
A reason that has been overlooked is that, ceteris paribus, those firms believed to display better growth prospects can hire workers at a lower wage. Since the workers' willingness to work for a lower entry-wage can more than compensate for the disadvantage introduced by an inefficient technology, even firms that produce inefficiently may end up dominating a market if workers believe they display sufficiently better prospects than the efficient ones. Can it happen in an equilibrium converging to a Walrasian-like state? I construct an example in which profits vanish, worker's expectations are fulfilled and, nevertheless, inefficient firms grow more and dominate the market in terms of market share. If at the early stages of the process of industry evolution workers are optimistic enough about prospects for advancement offered by the firms that produce inefficiently, almost all workers end up employed by inefficient firms in the long run. Therefore, firms do not face financial constraints and make zero profits, markets clear and almost all workers performing the same job receive the same wage, as in a Walrasian equilibrium.
In section 2 I define the game of imperfect information played by the firms and the infinite generations of workers for a fixed sequence of output prices. I characterize the equilibrium path of its Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) and prove existence in sections 3 and 4, respectively. In section 5, I define an Industry Equilibrium (IE) as a PBE where output prices clear the market. In section 6 and 7, I show there is an IE in which ex-ante identical firms follow identical growth paths and I discuss the efficiency properties of the IE for the case of ex-ante identical and heterogeneous firms, respectively. Proofs are in the Appendix. 
THE MODEL
At date zero, the industry adopts a new technology based in two tasks that use only labor as input. If q 1 and q 2 denote the level at which the two tasks are performed, then the output level, q, is given by
where 0 < α < 1.
Task 1 requires a skill that is not industry specific. If l is the number of workers employed in task 1, then q 1 (l) = l. 3 Every worker develops a new ability while performing the first task. Ability is a random variable that takes only two values: high or low; ability turns out to be high with probability λ ∈ (0, 1). Only high ability workers who have received training develop an industry specific skill necessary to perform the second task. A firm can find a worker who is suitable to perform the second task at t + 1 from one of two sources: 4 1. The employees that performed task 1 in the firm at t and developed high ability. 5 They can be trained at the beginning of t + 1, at a unit cost of c, to perform task 2 during t + 1. If the firm hires them, it is said to promote workers internally. If every worker performing task 2 has been promoted internally, the firm is said to have a closed internal labor market with one entry port.
2. The employees that performed task 1 in other firms in the industry at t. If one of these workers decides to move after being trained, he does not need additional training to perform the second task in his new job. However, he is not as productive as a skilled employee who worked in the same firm when young: e skilled workers that switch firms are as productive as e 1+θ , with θ > 0, skilled employees who are promoted internally. Larger values of θ correspond to greater firm specificity of the skill. A firm that employs them is said to hire workers externally.
If s and e are the number of internally promoted and externally hired workers, respectively, then q 2 (s, e) = s + e 1+θ denotes the level of activity of the second task. A firm that employs (l, s, e) workers at date t, obtains q (l, s, e; α) ≡ q 1 (l) α · q 2 (s, e) 1−α units of output at t + 1.
Workers
Every period t ≥ 0, a new generation of workers, who live for two periods, enters the labor force. Workers do not consume the good produced by this industry. They only face uncertainty about their ability and, therefore, about their wage when old. Workers have preferences over random bundles of the numeraire that display risk neutrality and discount the future at rate 0 < β < 1. A worker who does not work in this industry can work at home with expected lifetime utility w 1 + β · w 2 , when young, and w 2 ≥ w 1 > 0, when old. Without loss of generality, one may think that w 1 and w 2 are the productivities of a young and an old worker in the production of the numeraire. Since workers cannot borrow, they consume out of wages. I assume 
Efficient Allocations
The demand for the good, D(p), has standard properties.
Assumption AD: D : < + → < + is continuous and strictly decreasing for all p such that
β is the gross rate of return on a risk free investment opportunity. 7 Since this is a partial equilibrium model, to make efficiency judgments one has to make some additional assumptions. I assume that consumer surplus is an adequate measure of welfare and 1 r is the socially optimal discount rate. Since w 1 and w 2 are the productivities of young and old workers out of this industry, they measure the social cost of allocating workers to this industry. At any t ≥ 0, there are only two relevant types of labor for the planner: the young workers who perform task 1 and the old workers who performed task 1 in this industry when young. An industry is technologically efficient if more output cannot be produced using the same amount of every input and strictly less of one of them. As usual, the set of efficient allocations is the solution to the following Social Planner's problem where 
Firms
Firms have names in the set I of rational numbers in (0, 1), take the output price sequence P = {p t } ∞ t=0 ∈ < ∞ + as given, and are endowed with a 0 > 0 units of the numeraire and λ · l −1 ≥ 1−α w 2 +c · a 0 trainees. 10 The distribution of workers across firms satisfies a law of large numbers at each date: if firm i employs l workers in task 1 at date t, a fraction λ of these workers develops high ability. 11 Firms cannot borrow. At every t ≥ 0, each firm collects earnings and decides how much of its assets to invest in an alternative activity with gross rate of return r > 1 and what part to allocate as financial capital to hire inputs. 12 Figure 1 illustrates the timing of decisions.
6
The last condition implies there are prices so that firms that pay wages w1 and max w2, c θ to workers who perform the first and second task, respectively, can make positive profits. This assumption will guarantee that equilibrium output is not zero.
7
To simplify the analysis I do not consider the case in which β = 1 r even though all the results in this paper extend to that case.
8
A standard justification is that agents who consume the good produced in this industry have quasilinear preferences.
9
This is the appropriate benchmark because in all the equilibria I analyze later, the constraint does not bind either.
10
One can think that firms have been operating for a while, perhaps using another technology based only in task 1, and know the ability of those workers it employed before.
11
Since independence has no role in this model, the argument in Feldman and Gilles [9] implies that there exists a distribution of workers for which the law of large numbers holds in every Borel set. 
The hiring process
In principle, there is a large set of labor contracts a firm could offer to its workers. For example, one could imagine a contract in which the firm assigns a young worker to task 1, pays him a certain wage at date t and promises future wages contingent on being promoted or not. One could even think of a contract where the firm details the promotion rate at t+1, as in Malcomson [11] . However, many contracts like these are not implementable because of a lack of commitment by the workers or the firm. Therefore, I restrict the analysis to spot contracts.
Assumption AC: Firms can neither commit to a wage in the event a worker is promoted nor to a promotion rate.
At date t ≥ 0 every firm faces an infinite supply of young workers each of whom is contacted by just one firm.
If training were completely firm specific, one would expect the wage of a promoted worker to be w 2 because no other firm in this industry would be willing to hire such worker. In this model, however, the second task can be performed by workers hired internally or externally. Although internally promoted workers are more productive than the externally trained ones, a firm who hires externally avoids the training cost c. Evidently, for trained workers to have an outside opportunity within the industry it is necessary that there be a firm that is yet to train when his training process has ended. This seems very realistic. To capture this idea, I assume that between dates t and t + 1 firms carry out the training process sequentially. S i and D i denote the set of firms that train workers right before and after firm i does it. Of course, S i ∩ D i = ∅. For simplicity, I also assume #S i = #D i = N .
The interaction between the firms and the successive generations of workers define an extensive game Γ (P ).
At every date t ≥ 0, the game Γ (P ) consists of three stages: ¥ 1 st stage: Firms, simultaneously, decide the number of vacancies they open for the first task (l i,t ) and externally trained workers (e i,t ), the wage offers associated with the first task (w i,t ), internal promotions (v i,t ) and externally trained workers (v e i,t ), the financial capital (m i,t ) and the bond holdings (b i,t ). That is, every firm i ∈ I chooses a vector
Condition (2) limits the vacancies for young workers and externally trained workers to what firm i can finance at the announced wages using all its financial capital. In addition, firm i's financial capital and bond holdings must be non-negative and add up to the firm's assets (a i,t ), 
where
Because the number of workers who are offered training cannot exceed the number of high ability workers, the firm faces the following "internal labor market" constraint at t:
If s i,t < λ · b l i,t−1 , the firm decides at random who is offered training because, from its point of view, high ability workers are homogeneous. Since internal promotions must be financed with the money left after financing externally trained workers who accept employment in firm i, b e i,t , then 14
where the second line re ects that young workers who accepted employment in a firm that produced zero at t − 1 did not develop any ability because they did not perform the first task.
¥ 3 rd stage: Each old worker trained by firm i observes a random draw of b v e j,t for each j ∈ D i and decides whether to stay (choose i), move to some firm j ∈ D i that made him an offer or work at home (choose o).
Finally, firm i's assets at date t + 1 are
Implicit in condition (8) is that even though the financial capital the firm would use to pay the wage of those workers that reject employment cannot be invested in bonds, it can be stored and spent the following period.
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For any x, y ∈ <
14 Since training is costless for the worker, I assume every worker who is offered training accepts and, therefore, I use s i,t to denote also the number of workers who accept training.
Since a young worker contacted by firm i at date t only observes the wage offer w ≥ 0, his information set is
The function χ i,t (h) indicates whether the number of trainees in firm i at date t on path h is limited by its assets (χ i,t (h) = 0) or by its internal supply of high ability workers (χ i,t (h) = 1). 15 Let χ i t (h) be the vector
is the random vector in < N + with coordinates b v e j n ,t (h), j n ∈ D i , and probability distribution η i,t (h). Each worker trained by firm i at date t observes
and a random draw of b v i t (h). So, he observes a realization of
Strategies
The strategy of a worker born at t who is contacted by firm i is a pair σ i,t = ³ σ 1 i,t , σ 2 i,t+1´w here σ 1 i,t : < + → {A, R} is his response when young after being offered w by firm i and σ 2 i,t+1 :
is his response when old after being trained by firm i and observing v i,t (h). W i,t is the set of strategies of the workers born at t.
is the collection of strategies the infinite generations of workers play against firm i when all workers of a given generation play the same strategy against firm i.
A profile of strategies γ is a collection {f i , σ i } i∈I such that (f i , σ i ) ∈ F i × W i for every i ∈ I. γ −i and γ 0 −i are the collections {σ i , f j , σ j } j∈I,j6 =i and {f i , f j , σ j } j∈I,j6 =i , respectively. For a fixed profile γ, h * (γ) ∈ H ∞ and h * (x, γ) ∈ H ∞ denote the path of play and the path of play after partial history x ∈ H t ∪ H t , respectively.
Payoffs, beliefs and equilibrium
At date t, an old worker, who underwent training in firm i and observes a realization of v i,t (h), can stay in firm i and obtain wage v i,t , or join firm j ∈ D i and receive wage b v e j,t , or work at home and get w 2 . His payoff is
which is independent of both the history of the game and the other players' strategies. The expected payoff of an old worker at date t on path h before observing
The payoff of firms and young workers, instead, does depend on the history up to that date. Therefore, one needs to specify their beliefs about the history of the game conditional on their information up to that date.
Let I t and I 1 t be the sets of all information sets of firms and young workers at date t, respectively. I is the set of all information sets of firms and young workers. Since each ξ ∈ I is a countable product of rectangles in the Euclidean space, in order to define beliefs one needs to define an appropriate measurable structure. Let F (ξ) be the σ-algebra generated by the elements of ξ and (ξ, F (ξ)) be a measurable space. A system of beliefs is a
Definition 2.1 A system of beliefs Ψ is consistent with a profile of strategies γ if the following conditions hold
(i) if ξ = I i,t ¡ h t i (h * ) ¢ for some i ∈ I and t ≥ 0, then Ψ ξ (E) = 1 if h t (h * ) ∈ E and Ψ ξ (E) = 0 otherwise (ii) if ξ = I 1 i,t ³ h t i (h * )´for some i ∈ I and t ≥ 0, then Ψ ξ (E) = 1 if h t (h * ) ∈ E and Ψ ξ (E) = 0 otherwise.
Remark 1:
Defining an appropriate filtration on the measurable space (H ∞ , H ∞ ), where H ∞ denotes the Borel sets of H ∞ , one can show that conditions (i) and (ii) are equivalent to requiring that the system of beliefs Ψ satisfies Bayes' rule whenever possible.
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Firm i's continuation payoff after partial history
Since each young worker born at t contacted by firm i observes only firm i's wage offer, the probability of being promoted the following period depends on the number of young workers who accept employment in firm i at date t. Hence, his payoff after partial history x t ∈ H t is:
Finally, I define the equilibrium concept for the game of imperfect but complete information Γ (P ).
Definition 2.2 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of Γ (P )
is a profile of strategies γ = {f i , σ i } i∈I and a system of beliefs Ψ such that for every
2.
4. Ψ is consistent with γ.
EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION
In this section I characterize the equilibrium wages, vacancies and financial capital. I begin providing a version of the one-stage deviation property for Γ (P ). In section 3.1, I show that skilled workers are paid their best outside offer. In particular, when no worker changes firms after the training process has ended, competition drives the skilled workers' wage (weakly) above c θ , the wage that makes a firm indifferent between promoting internally and hiring a worker trained by another firm. In section 3.2, I provide a mild condition on beliefs under which young workers obtain their reservation lifetime utility and explain why this condition implies that firms that promote a larger fraction of their workers pay, ceteris paribus, lower entry-wages. In section 3.3, I solve for the vacancies opened by each firm and the associated sequences of entry-wages and growth rates in an equilibrium in which workers get their reservation lifetime utility and firms offer the same wage to externally trained workers.
The equilibrium path of the game Γ (P ) satisfies a strong version of the one-stage deviation property: if a firm has a short run gain at τ , then it cannot promote s i,τ +1 (h * ) workers the following period. Otherwise the firm could continue with the same hiring policy it chooses on h * and reinvest the additional assets in bonds forever, increasing its payoff.
The equilibrium wages of skilled workers.
Suppose (γ, Ψ) is a PBE of Γ (P ) and h * is the equilibrium path. Proposition 3.2 (i) argues that the wage offer made by a firm where some workers accept an internal promotion must be at least what those workers could make at home. In Proposition 3.2 (ii) I show that if every worker trained by firm i accepts an internal promotion, then firm i's skilled workers are paid their best outside offer. That is, the wage of skilled workers matches either what they can make at home or the offer of some firm j, that is v e j,t (h * ) = v i,t (h * ) > w 2 ; otherwise firm i could offer a slightly lower wage to the workers it trains and increase its earnings.
Trivially, Proposition 3.2 (i) implies that when w 2 ≥ obtain their reservation lifetime utility, assumption AW suffices to rule out the possibility of a shortage in the internal pool of high ability workers . Later, I show that firms that promote a larger fraction of their workers can hire, ceteris paribus, workers at a lower entry wage , i.e. they display better prospects for advancement.
Since firms have no incentive to pay young workers more than what is necessary to induce them to accept employment, intuition suggests that the equilibrium entry-wage should be the lowest wage that keeps them indifferent between his two options. A sufficient condition for this result is that the set of wage offers that are strictly preferred to working at home is an open set, a condition that is always satisfied when w 2 ≥ c θ and
Proposition 3.4 Suppose
Since in the early stages of the evolution of an industry firms are financially constrained, those that pay lower wages produce more and obtain more revenue to finance expansion. In order to explain the outcome of industry evolution it is important, therefore, to identify what enables one firm to hire workers at a lower wage than another.
Insofar worker's abilities are, at least to some degree, firm specific and developed by on-the-job training, one would expect that a young worker's entry-wage depends not only on his opportunity cost and future wages, but also on other factors such as his beliefs about the opportunities for promotion within the firm. For the moment, I will be rather vague and call all those relevant factors "the prospects for advancement" displayed by the firm.
Definition 3.2 A worker believes that firm i displays better prospect for advancement than firm j if he is willing to work in firm i at a lower wage than in firm j.
Consider a young worker who receives a wage offer w, believes the probability of being promoted is z and his wage upon promotion will be v * . Then his lifetime expected utility is
if he joins the firm or w 1 + β · w 2 if he works at home. Let w (z, v * ) be his reservation entry-wage, the wage which makes him indifferent between accepting a job at date t or not. It is the unique w which solves
What makes a worker believe one firm displays better prospects for advancement than another? Lemma 3.1
shows that, ceteris paribus, one firm displays better prospects for advancement than another at date t if and only if the worker expects the former will promote a larger fraction of its employees than the latter at t + 1. 
.
There are at least two factors that could limit the growth of firms along the process of industry evolution. First, firms might not achieve their optimal size immediately because they do not have enough financial capital to finance expansion. This is represented by the financial capital constraints (2) and (7). Second, firms may face a shortage in their internal labor market. That is, even if financial capital were available to promote more workers, the internal pool might not contain as many high ability candidates as workers the firm would like to hire. This is constraint (6).
In principle, any of these constraints may be binding during the process of industry evolution. In Proposition 3.5, however, I show that assumption AW rules out this second possibility along the equilibrium path. Indeed, since a young worker hired by firm i at date t believes his probability of being trained the following period is
, the internal labor market constraint does not bind on h * provided young workers are paid their reservation entry wage and v i,t+1 (h * ) ≥ v * upon promotion. Otherwise, assumption AW implies his reservation entry-wage is zero which would contradict the existence of a best response for firm i.
Proposition 3.5 Suppose AW & E
3.3 The evolution of entry-wages in a *PBESO.
In this section I characterize the vacancies and entry-wages along the equilibrium path of a *PBESO where skilled workers are paid v * . I begin with a result I use in Proposition 3.6 (iv) to characterize the relationship between entry-wages and the growth rate of financial capital. 
Lemma 3.2 For any
In Proposition 3.6 (i) I prove that if wage offers leave young workers indifferent between accepting or rejecting employment, the entry-wage,
, v * ´. In Proposition 3.6 (ii) I show that when v * = c θ , old workers do not change firms after the training process has ended. Otherwise, since training is costly and firms are indifferent between promoting internally and hiring externally at wage c θ , a firm that loses some trained workers would have a profitable deviation. Indeed, that firm could open exactly as many vacancies for externally trained workers as it needs to produce q i,t (h * ) and raise slightly its wage offer to every high ability worker so that those vacancies would be covered and no internally promoted worker would leave after the training process has ended.
Since the wage increase could be arbitrarily small, the increase in the wage bill would be more than compensated by the reduction in training costs and the freed financial capital could be invested in bonds. Proposition 3.6 (iii) applies Proposition 3.1 to argue that if (6) does not bind at t and t + 1 on h * , the firm hires workers, at wages w i,t (h * ) and v * , to maximize next period sales revenue subject to a financial constraint. To understand the intuition, notice that if the firm were to deviate from this criterion, it would have fewer assets the following period. Since the firm wants to maximize the discounted sum of its assets and the production function is concave, this deviation could only make sense if it relaxes constraint (6), a possibility that is ruled out by hypothesis. This result together with Proposition 3.5 and assumption AW allows me to write the promotion rate and the young workers' entry-wage as a function of the financial capital growth rate. Indeed, since
and firm i's promotion rate is
iii. If
iv. If
Proposition 3.6 (iv) makes it clear that to obtain the sequence of entry-wages one needs to pin down the sequence of financial capital growth rates and this is the issue I focus on for the reminder of this section. There are two levels of the reservation entry-wage that are key: the reservation entry-wage associated with an stationary level of financial capital, ω (1, α i ), and the reservation entry-wage associated with a growth rate of r, ω (r, α i ). For each of these wages, one can define the output price so that the firm's rate of return is r, i.e. the output price which is equal to the firm's marginal cost.
Suppose at t + 1 firm i fully reinvests its earnings from sales, that is
, and young workers get their reservation utility. Then, the entry-wage, w i,t (h * ), solves the following equation in w: In the presence of financial constraints and no fixed costs, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the early stages of the process of industry evolution are characterized by a high output price and positive profits. This induces some firms to fully reinvest their earnings, driving down the output price until profits vanish. It is also natural to think the industry eventually converges to a steady state where financial capital stays constant and every firm makes zero profits. If this conjecture is correct and firms are ex-ante identical, Proposition 3.6 implies that the young workers' wage and the output price converge to ω (1, α i ) and p s (α i ), respectively. The rate of return of firms that fully reinvest earnings along the transition to the steady state is bounded above by
profits to be positive along the transition, therefore, it is necessary that
Thus, it seems natural to restrict the search to sequences of prices in the set
Let ω L (p, α) be the unique w solving q (w, α) = r p . In Proposition 3.7 I show that for any P ∈ Σ the equilibrium path of a *PBESO where firm i's skilled workers are paid v * displays the following property: if τ is the first time firm i's entry-wage, w i,t (h * ), differs from ω H (p t , α i ), then it must be strictly greater than ω H (p τ , α i ) at that date; furthermore, firm i's profits are zero at any date following τ , i.e. w i,t (h * ) = ω L (p t , α i ) for all t ≥ τ . Since the entry-wage is different from ω H (p τ , α i ) at date τ , it must be that firm i does not fully reinvest its earnings as financial capital at τ + 1. Because entry-wages are decreasing in financial capital, the date τ entrywage must be higher than ω H (p τ , α i ). Since firms maximize revenue subject to a financial constraint, if a firm does not allocate all its assets to financial capital at some date τ , then it must be because it makes zero profits at date τ . The remaining result follows because once maximum profits are zero at some date, they must be zero forever. The intuition behind this is as follows. Since the output price is strictly above p r , the firm makes zero profits only if young workers born at t believe it will not fully reinvest the sales revenue as financial capital at t +1; the latter can only happen if at the t + 1 entry-wage the firm makes zero profits again.
Proposition 3.7
Suppose AW holds, P ∈ Σ and (γ, Ψ) is a *PBESO with v i,t (h * ) = v * > w 2 for every t ≥ 0.
If there exists
τ such that w i,τ (h * ) 6 = ω H (p τ , α i ) for the first time, then w i,τ (h * ) ∈ ¡ ω H (p τ , α i ) , w 1 ¤ and w i,t (h * ) = ω L (p t , α i ) for every t ≥ τ + 1 such that m i,t (h * ) > 0.
Discussion of assumptions and results
Even though the possibility that a shortage in the firm's internal labor market can be responsible for the slow growth of an industry is realistic, it complicates the analysis enormously. Assumption AW rules that possibility out because it implies that promotion brings about a welfare change that is so large that if workers believed the promotion probability were λ and the wage upon promotion were c θ , they would work for free when young, i.e. w ¡ λ, c θ ¢ ≤ 0, which would contradict the existence of a best response for the firms.
Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 let one conclude that each *PBESO where v i,t (h * ) = v * describes the behavior of firms that set up a closed internal labor market with one entry port and an up or out promotion system where skilled workers are paid their best outside offer and no trained worker changes firms after the training process has ended. 16 If c θ > w 2 , the skilled worker's wage is above what they would obtain out of the industry and so small changes in market conditions (i.e. changes in w 2 ) do not affect it.
Moreover, Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 (iii) imply that if AW holds, each firm maximizes next period's sales revenue subject to a financial constraint, firm i's production is q (
, and the financial capital rate of return at t is R * (p t , w i,
Finally, Propositions 3.6 (iv) and 3.7 let us conclude that if AW holds, either each firm makes zero profits and fully reinvests its capital up to date T − 1 or it makes zero profits and its financial capital growth rate is
The best outside offer depends on c and θ because of the assumption that some firms are yet to train when others have ended their training process. This contrasts with Bernhardt and Scoones [6] where competitors incur a cost to learn the ability of outside workers but that cost does not affect the best outside offer. This is because, in their model, firms bid for workers after that cost is sunk.
OPTIMISTIC AND PESSIMISTIC PBE
In this section I prove that there exists a *PBESO where skilled workers are paid v * and ex ante identical firms follow different growth paths that converge to a steady state where profits are zero and workers receive the same wage regardless of the firm that employs them. First, I define a family of strategies for firms and workers. Proposition 4.1 shows that any of the sequences of entry-wages, and its associated sequences of financial capital growth rates, described in Proposition 3.7 can be sustained as part of the path of play of a strategy profile in that family. Proposition 4.2 shows that there exists a profile of strategies in that family and a system of beliefs that constitutes a *PBESO for a large subset of output price sequences in Σ.
Let
o is the set of firms that match firm i's offer and face a binding internal labor market constraint at information set
. 17 Old workers choose to work
where they obtain the highest wage and when indifferent between two or more wage offers they only leave the place where they were trained if the outside offer comes from a firm which faces a binding internal labor market constraint. Clearly, e σ 2 i,t satisfies condition (i) in the definition of a PBE. For each P ∈ Σ and t ≥ 0 define a family, parameterized by δ ∈ [0, 1] and T ≥ T s , of functions e σ 1 t (T, δ |α, P ) : < + 7 → < + and e f t (T, δ |α, P ) : < 3 + 7 → < 7 + such that e f t (T, δ |α, P ) = ³ e l t (α) , e e t (α) , e w t (T, δ |α, P ) , v * , v * , e m t (T, δ) , e b t´w here e b t (l, m, a) = a − e m t (T, δ) and
If two firms meet the criteria in the second line of the definition of the strategy, then the worker chooses the one with the lowest subindex. This choice of a tie breaking rule is, of course, without loss of generality.
The cut-off wage of σ H i,t is the reservation entry-wage of a worker who believes his promotion probability is that of a firm that reinvests all its assets as financial capital if t ≤ T −1, it reinvests a fraction δ of them if t = T and keeps its financial capital constant if t > T . Firm i offers the cutoff value of σ H i,t to the young workers it contacts and spends its financial capital as if it were maximizing short run constrained profits. For fixed T ≥ T s and δ ∈ [0, 1], I H ⊂ I denotes the subset of firms where workers and firms play
The strategy
here G (w, α) is the inverse of ω (g, α) and
If firm i faces workers that play strategy σ L i , it can just make zero profits from date 1 on hiring workers at the cutoff wages and, therefore, it is (weakly) optimal to reduce its financial capital along time; strategy f L i specifies a path of reinvestment that justifies the workers' pessimism about the prospects for advancement offered firm i. For fixed w L 0 ≥ 0, I L ⊂ I denotes the subset of firms where workers and firms play
Let b γ be the profile of strategies where a fraction μ H of the firms belongs to I H and a fraction 1 − μ H belongs to I L . The following proposition shows that on the path of play b h induced by b γ, no trained worker change firms and no firm face a binding internal labor market constraint. In addition, firms in I H fully reinvest earnings while firms in I L reduce their financial capital during the transition towards the steady state.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose
ii. If AW holds, then b e i,t ³ b h´= 0 and s i,t ³ b h´=
To show that no trained worker leaves firm i when the skilled worker wage is v * , it is key to argue that To define a PBE one needs to specify the beliefs of the players on information sets off the equilibrium path.
Let b Ψ be a system of beliefs consistent with b γ that at each information set, I i,t ¡ x t i ¢ or I 1 i,t (w), off the equilibrium path puts mass one on some partial history b
is the set of paths where (a) firm i's competitors would not face a binding internal labor market constraint even if all its external offers were rejected, and (b) they offer v * to trained workers, as on b h, and (c) the supply of externally trained workers i faces exceeds i's demand, what is consistent with perfect competition in the output market. Off the equilibrium path, therefore, firm i believes there are enough trained workers willing to join it and, therefore, (6) limits only the number of internal promotions but not its production level, what allows me to break the intertemporal problem of the firm at each information set in a sequence of one-period problems. 19 For the young worker, I assume that when w > w i,t
is the set of paths where firm i's behavior differs from d i,t ³ b h´in that it opens more external vacancies, a condition that guarantees the promotion rate and, therefore, the young worker's expected utility increases with wages. If w < w i,t ³ b h´, the young worker's payoff is independent of beliefs because he anticipates every other young worker rejects employment so that nobody will be promoted at t + 1. Hence, I assume Ω 1 i,t (w) = I 1 i,t (w). So, b Ψ seems a natural choice for the players' beliefs.
Let p * * (α i ) = r q(w1,αi) be the marginal cost of a firm expected to shut down the next period, i.e. w 1 = ω (0, α i ). 
Proposition 4.2 Suppose
· λ for every i ∈ I and P is non-increasing.
ii. If μ H < 1, AW holds, w L 0 ∈ (w, w), and p t ≤ p * * (α i ) for every t ≥ 1 and i ∈ I L , then
The *PBESO in (i) describes an industry where workers are optimistic about the prospects for advancement displayed by every firm. In the PBE described in (ii), workers are optimistic about some firms and pessimistic about others and this may happen even if firms are ex-ante identical, that is when α i = α for every i ∈ I. Here one needs to impose the additional assumption that p t ≤ p * * (α i ) for every t ≥ 1 and i ∈ I L so that the growth rate of firms in I L is nonnegative. The behavior of firms in I H or I L differs along the transition to the steady state.
Even though ex-ante identical firms follow different growth paths, the worker's entry-wage converges to the same level at date T because w i,t (h) = ω L (p s , α i ) = ω (1, α i ) for every t ≥ T . Hence, firms playing f H i and f L i stop
18
A formal definition of these sets can be found in the appendix.
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Recall that when c θ ≥ w 2 , it costs the same to produce one unit of task 2 employing internally promoted workers or hiring externally trained workers. growing and pay the same wage from date T on. Any difference in their steady state size, therefore, originates during the transition towards the stationary state.
For fixed μ H , Proposition 4.2 identifies a continuum of PBE indexed by δ ∈ [0, 1] and w L 0 ∈ (w, w). In section 5, I show that for each w L 0 ∈ (w, w) the value of δ is pinned down by the output market clearing condition.
Robustness
The assumption that workers live for two periods, together with the fact that the internal labor market constraint never binds, implies firms never raid and train immediately a high ability worker who is not promoted by other firm. This is because he is less productive than a worker promoted internally but must be paid the same wage upon promotion. If the worker lived for three periods or more, however, he could be trained in the third period of his life either by the first period employer or by a firm who raid him in the second period to perform the first task.
However, no firm would be willing to do so because it costs the same to train him than to train a worker who has developed high ability and is two-years old but the latter can perform the second task for one period more than the former. Consequently, a high ability worker who has not been trained by another firm can perform only task 1 and must be paid at least w 2 . Since young workers are willing to perform the same task at a lower wage, therefore, no firm would raid high ability workers even if they lived more than two periods. Likewise, an increase in the number of periods a worker lives does not affect his wage upon promotion since this wage is determined by the trade-off between the training cost and the specific ability faced by the competitors of his first-period employer.
INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM
The concept of equilibrium used in the previous sections does not require the output market to clear at the prices the firms take as given. This is a drawback because the evolution of output prices is related to the evolution of firms' assets through the market clearing condition. To capture this aspect of industry evolution, I define an Industry Equilibrium (IE) as a collection of strategies, beliefs and output prices P such that the strategies of firms and workers are a PBE of Γ (P ) and the output market clears on the equilibrium path of Γ (P ).
To simplify the exposition, I assume α i ∈ {α H , α L } for every i ∈ I. Moreover, since the family of strategies considered in section 4 is rich enough to sustain any outcome described in Propositions 3.6 and 3. A plausible story of how ex-ante identical firms end up partitioned in these two sets is as follows. At date zero, after firms announce their names, each worker who is contacted by some employer observes the realization of a binary sunspot variable that assigns probability μ H to f 
Definition 5.1 An Industry Equilibrium
(IE) is a © P, μ H , γ, Ψ ª such that P ∈ < ∞ + , μ H ∈ [0, 1] and 1. (γ, Ψ) is a *PBESO of Γ (P ) in which either i ∈ I L or i ∈ I H , 2. q H t (h * ) · μ H + q L t (h * ) · ¡ 1 − μ H ¢ = D (p t ), for every t ≥ 0,
INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM WITH EX ANTE IDENTICAL FIRMS

Unconstrained IE
I begin with the case in which a 0 ≥ p s ·D(p s ) r and so firms have enough assets to drive profits to zero from the start. Let P s be the sequence with p t = p s for all t ≥ 0. Clearly, P s ∈ Σ. In any IE associated to P s , every firm is in I H , for T = 0 and δ = ps·D(ps) r·a0 , and the industry output level is D (p s ). Hence, ex-ante identical firms produce the same, firms are not financially constrained and workers performing the same task receive the same wage regardless of the firm that employs them. If v * = w 2 , then p s = p * and allocative efficiency holds. Otherwise, too little is produced with respect to the efficient allocation (i.e. p s > p * ) but technological efficiency holds because each firm pays wages ω (1) and v * and maximizes profits.
To understand why too little is produced when v * > w 2 , notice that the marginal cost is p s = r q(ω(1)) while the marginal cost in the efficient allocation is p * = r q * , where
The two marginal costs are equal if and only if v * = w 2 and so ω (1) = w 1 . So it suffices to argue that v * > w 2 implies q (ω (1)) < q * . The answer is not obvious because as v * increases, the wage of young workers decreases.
However, since workers discount the future, a marginal increase in v * leads to a less than proportional reduction in
· (v * − w 2 ) and s i,t (h * ) = s i,t+1 (h * ), it follows that
In this section, to simplify notation, I omit the parameter α in the functions q, ω , ω H , ω L , ps, pr and p * .
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Therefore, (l i,t (h * ) , s i,t (h * )) is in the feasible set of problem (13) which implies that q (ω (1)) < q * .
Remark 3:
This argument shows that the lack of allocative efficiency in the steady state does not depend on the assumption that firms are financially constrained; the impossibility of enforcing a long term contract in which an old worker is paid w 2 induces the lack of allocative efficiency. 
Identical Growth Paths
Suppose there is an IE with μ H = 1. From date T on, the output price is p s , the entry-wage is ω (1), total
by market clearing. The unknowns, then, are the output prices along the transition towards the steady state, that is, the sequence however, market clearing requires p t to be the value of p that solves
If T > 1, Lemma 6.1 implies that p 0 = P (a 0 ). One concludes that for any T ≥ 1, the workers' date zero entrywage is unique. Indeed,
conditions (14) and (15) show that prices and entry-wages depend only on the aggregate financial capital at any
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 and i ∈ I, the uniqueness of p 0 implies there is at most one equilibrium sequence of prices in Σ when every firm belongs to I H .
In order to prove the existence of an IE, I construct a sequence P ∈ Σ by iterating the map P until the first date that full reinvestment of revenues would make the aggregate financial capital larger than
. That date is the 21 candidate for date T − 1; to complete the sequence {p t } T −1 t=0 , I choose p T −1 to be the solution of (14) The example in the next section, in turn, shows that a credit constraint is necessary to explain why ex-ante identical firms might follow different growth paths and have different market shares in the long run.
Different Growth Paths
Now suppose μ H ∈ (0, 1) and AW holds. Proposition 6.2 explains how the retained earnings dynamic selects among firms that promote workers internally since it shows that in any IE with P ∈ Σ, those firms that display the worst prospects for advancement at date zero continue to show the worst prospects up to date T .
Proposition 6.2
Suppose μ H ∈ (0, 1) and AW holds. If w i,0 (h * ) ∈ (w, w) and P ∈ Σ, then i ∈ I L and w i,t (h * ) > w j,t (h * ) for every t such 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 and j ∈ I H .
It follows from Proposition 6.2 that firms that display better prospects for advancement at date zero have a higher growth rate along the transition towards the steady state and a higher steady state market share than firms that, ceteris paribus, initially show worse prospects for advancement. One concludes that among ex-ante identical firms, the retained earning dynamic favors those firms that display better prospects for advancement at date zero.
The rest of this section characterizes an IE in which ex-ante identical firms follow different growth paths and T > 1; later I use this characterization to construct an example. At date zero, the output price must satisfy
where the left hand side is the date zero short run industry supply function. For any initial level of aggregate financial capital, a 0 = a H 0 + a L 0 , the assumption that w L 0 > w implies the industry supply shifts to the left when compared to the case in which firms display equal prospects for advancement. Therefore, there is an excess of demand at P (a 0 ), the price which solves (16) when μ H = 1. Likewise, there is an excess of supply at the price P ¡ a H 0 ¢ . Since the date zero supply function is strictly increasing in prices, demand is strictly decreasing and both functions are continuous, there exists a unique
If pr · D (pr) ≥ ps · D (ps), it can be shown that the equilibrium I find is the unique IE with P ∈ Σ.
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Since firm i ∈ I L makes zero profits at any 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 but wages are bounded above by w 1 , then output prices are bounded above by p * * = r q(w 1 ) . In addition, p t solves
The left side of this equation is the short run industry supply.
there is an excess of demand at any price
¢ that clears the market.
At T − 1, the same reasoning that motivated (14) implies
Clearly, δ =
Example 1:
Demand is D (p) = . Firms in I L display worst prospects for advancement than those in I H iff w L 0 > 0.08. Hence, the date zero price must exceed 2 √ 6, the market clearing price when all firms display equal prospects for advancement. Then,
and so w = w 1 . By (16), (17) and Proposition 4.2,
Ψ´o is an IE with
Let u ' 0.105. On the left hand side of figure 2,
for all t ≥ 1 and then (i) and (ii) hold. The choice of u ensures 0 < m
This functional form simplifies the analysis because the industry revenue at date 1 exceeds the steady state financial capital. However, if firms follow different strategies it may take more than one period for the industry to converge to the steady state. This is because the assets of those firms that display good growth prospects may fall short of the steady state level at date 1. 
For each w L 0 ∈ (u, 0.2], ex-ante identical firms follow different growth paths. On the right hand side of Figure  2 , I plot the steady state market share of firms in I L and I H for each w L 0 . For large values of w L 0 , firms in I L display very poor prospects for advancement at date zero and they are almost driven out at date 2. For example, if the date zero entry-wage is larger than 0.18, the steady state market share of firms in I L is smaller than 1%. ¤ This example shows that ex-ante identical firms can follow different growth paths and have different sizes in the steady state. Since firms pay different wages to their young workers along the transition, technological efficiency holds only in the steady state. My analysis of the cases where firms are unconstrained or v * = w 2 implies these results depend both on financial constraints and the impossibility of enforcing a wage w 2 for skilled workers.
INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS
In this section, I provide the example in which firms have different technologies, one firm produces inefficiently every period but it dominates the market, in terms of market share, in the long run.
With some abuse of notation, let q (l, s; α i ) denote q (l, s, 0; α i ). In Figure 3 , I illustrate the relationship between the two production functions plotting the isoquant associated with output level q for each technology.
Recall that firm i ∈ I H if α i = α H and i ∈ I L if α i = α L . If both firms choose an input bundle that lies below the diagonal, firms in I H produce inefficiently. Indeed, since q (l, s;
v * +c < 1 for all t ≥ 0 and α H < α L , firms in I H produce inefficiently and firms in I L produce efficiently every period.
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It can also be shown that for any w In example 2, I show that if young workers are pessimistic enough about the prospects displayed by firms in I L , firms in I H end up dominating the market. Let w i s = ω (1, α i ) be firm i's steady state entry-wage. Since both firms must make zero profits in steady state, the technologies must satisfy: I choose the parameters so that assumption AW and condition (18) 
In the left panel of Figure 4 , the dashed line corresponds to p 0 , the solution to the first equation, while the full line corresponds to p 1 , the solution to the second equation. ,
, α H´, α H´> r. By proposition 4.2, an IE exists.
In the IE every firm makes zero profits from date 2 on. If at date zero, young workers believe firms in Figure  4 ) which means that almost all the production is carried out by workers of firms in I H . In those steady states not only every firm makes zero profits, is not financially constrained and maximizes profits, but also almost all workers who perform the same job receive the same wage, regardless of the firm that hires them, as in a Walrasian equilibrium. However, these equilibria are productively inefficient in a strong sense. Notice that
If all labor were allocated to firm L, more output could be produced without altering workers' welfare. ¤
CONCLUSION
In competitive output markets, the retained earnings dynamic gives an evolutionary advantage to firms with lower unit costs. However, unit costs are determined not only by technological efficiency but also by wages.
Unlike in Walrasian markets, worker's expectations about the opportunities for advancement within the firm are key to determine wages in internal labor markets. As a consequence, the fitness of a firm depends not only on its technological efficiency but also on workers' beliefs. This paper suggests that, at least in the long run, the retained earnings dynamic justifies the use of the standard static analysis of competitive markets to make positive predictions but does not justify its efficiency properties. Unlike in Blume and Easley's model [7] , even the steady state of the retained earnings dynamic may fail to be efficient. In contrast with Beker [4] , I do not need to assume a stochastic technology to show that inefficient firms can dominate a competitive output market. As in Arthur [2] , what happens at the origin of the industry has a decisive role on the technology that dominates the market.
However, it is not a network externality or the presence of increasing returns what drives the result but the young workers' beliefs about the prospects for advancement offered by the firms.
APPENDIX
A. PROOFS OF SECTIONS 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Suppose not. Consider e
where e f i,t : H t i 7 → < 7 + is defined as follows:
i is the partial history of firm i consisting in h τ i (h * ) followed by the actions of the firms and workers induced by
holds at k = τ . So, if one proves that
for all k such that τ +1 ≤ k ≤ t, then (19) holds for all k such that τ +1 ≤ k ≤ t. Clearly, (20) holds at k = τ +1.
We prove by induction that it holds for all τ + 1 ≤ k ≤ t. Suppose it holds up to k ≥ τ + 1 for some k < t. Since
and iterating backwards one obtains (20).
The argument in (a) -(c) implies that e
A contradiction is reached because
Since old workers trained by firm i who stay in firm i at wage v i,t (h * ) still accept when offered v, then firm i has a profitable deviation. Indeed,
and (1) in the definition of PBE implies b e i,t (h) = b e i,t (h * ) and
because those accepting a promotion at v i,t (h * ) continue to accept at v. Thus,
. By (9) and the assumption that Suppose, instead, some workers trained by firm i reject the offer of some firm j that matches firm i's offer.
Then, b
e j,t (h * ) < e j,t (h * ). Let ε 0 > 0 be the number of firm i's workers who reject an firm j's offer on h * . Since hiring workers trained by another firm for less than c θ is more profitable than promoting internally, firm j could profitably deviate by offering v slightly above v i,t (h * ) so that every worker in firm i who receives an offer accepts.
where I use the fact that v e j,t (h * ) = v i,t (h * ) and
By hypothesis, there is w < w i,t (h * ) such that (3) in the definition of PBE implies that young workers accept employment on
It is easy to see 
. ¥ Proof of Proposition 3.5: Suppose
Proof of Proposition 3.6: (i) Since
, v * ´.
(ii) Suppose not. Then, 
follows by definition of e m and e b and because e m < m i,t (h * ). Then, there is h such that
Since
1+θ and, therefore, q i,t (h) = q i,t (h * ). Consequently,
29
Finally, (21), (22) and q i,t (h) = q i,t (h * ) implies that
where the first inequality follows because r > 1. But this contradicts
, v e i,t (h * ) , m i,t (h * ) , b i,t (h * )ẃ here (l ε , e ε ) = (1 − ε) · ¡ l i,t (h * ) ,
w i,t (h * ) ,
(1−αi)·mi,t(h * ) v * ´a nd ε ∈ (0, 1). Clearly, d ε ∈ A i,t (h * ). By the hypothesis and the definition of e ε , there is e ε ∈ (0, 1) such that v * v * +c · e ε < λ · b l i,t−1 (h * ) and s i,t+1 (h * ) < λ · h
(1 − e ε) · l i,t (h * ) + e ε · α i ·m i,t (h * ) w i,t (h * ) i
. Consider h such that
for every j 6 = i and h = h * ³ h t (h) , γ´.
Since w i,t (h) = w i,t (h * ), then b l i,t (h) = l i,t (h) = l ε and λ · b l i,t (h) > s i,t+1 (h * ). By Proposition 3.1, R i,t (h) ≤ R i,t (h * ). Since b e i,t (h * ) = 0, then m i,t (h * )−w i,t (h * )·l i,t (h * ) v * +c = s i,t (h * ) < λ· b l i,t−1 (h * ). Also, Since w i,t (h) = w i,t (h * ), then b l i,t (h) = l ε and λ · b l i,t (h) > s i,t+1 (h * ). By Proposition 3.1, R i,t (h) ≤ R i,t (h * ).
A reasoning analogous to the one used in Proposition 3.6 (ii) shows that b e i,t (h) = 0 and b s i,t (h) = b s i,t (h * ). Then, m i,t (h * ) < p t · q (w i,t (h * ) , α i ) ≤ r. By Lemma A.1, p t+1 · q (w i,t+1 (h * ) , α i ) ≤ r. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2:
The proof consists in three steps. The first step shows that the payoff of playing
where h 0 = h * ¡ b x t , b γ ¢ . The second step shows no other strategy can yield a larger payoff to firm i. The third step argues that no young worker has a profitable deviation either at date t. To show that (23) holds, it suffices to argue that for every k ≥ t
First, I show that χ j,k (h 0 ) = 0 for all k ≥ t + 1 and j ∈ I. That (24) holds for any k ≥ t + 1 then follows by Lemma A.3. Since w j,k (h 0 ) is the cutoff value of the young workers' strategy at date k ≥ t for every j ∈ I, then b l j,k (h 0 ) = e l k (α j ) [l j,k−1 (h 0 ) , m j,k−1 (h 0 ) , a j,k (h 0 )] = α j w j,k ( h) · m j,k (h 0 ) for every k ≥ t and j ∈ I. Therefore, · λ and P is nonincreasing, then by an argument analogous to the one used in Lemma A.3.
Then, (24) holds for any k ≥ t and we conclude (23) also holds for any x t i 6 = h t i ³ b h´.
Second step: Suppose firm i has a profitable deviation at information set I i,t ¡ x t i ¢ . Then there exists a strategy
¢ where h 00 = h * ¡ b x t , f, b γ −i ¢ , there is k ≥ t such that R i,k (h 00 ) > R * (p k , w i,k (h 0 ) , α i ). Since R * (p k , w i,k (h 0 ) , α i ) ≥ r, it follows that R i,k (h 00 ) > r and m i,k (h 00 ) > 0. This implies that b l i,k (h 00 ) > 0 and b s i,k (h 00 )+ s i,k (h 00 ) + v e i,k (h 00 ) · b e i,k (h 00 ) ≤ m i,k (h 00 ). Therefore,
